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MODEL CITIES: LIBERAL MYTHS AND
FEDERAL INTERVENTIONIST PROGRAMS
STEVEN ARTHUR WALDHORN*
JUDITH LYNCH WALDHORN**
All federal community development efforts undertaken in the past
twenty years have been based on a related series of "liberal" myths
about the nature of social change. In succession, each program-from
slum clearance to community action-has purported to seek to reform
the intergovernmental system by intervening at some crucial point
without supplying the resources to change it fundamentally. Model
Cities is the most recent in this series of programs, and its history illus-
trates the scope and limits of the liberal "interventionist" approach.
Federal interventionist programs have often been designed to
achieve multiple aims by "leveraging" limited national resources to
affect entire patterns of development in poverty neighborhoods.
Model Cities attempted to perfect the interventionist approach by
combining a number of strategies into one program designed to im-
prove the quality of life in blighted neighborhoods. Each strategy was
based on the broad assumption that neither massive institutional
change nor a quantum leap in resources was needed to accomplish
meaningful social change.
Although its original strategies have proven to be based on a set of
untenable premises, Model Cities, in a small but significant number of
cities, is providing a framework within which important strategies for
B.A., New York University, 1962; L.L.B., Yale, 1966; M.A., Princeton, 1967.
** B.A., 1964, M.A., 1967, M.C.P., 1967, University of California at Berkeley.
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achieving some urban change are being developed. Ironically, the
success of Model Cities in these cities, as much as any other factor,
points out the limitations of the program's original conceptions.
OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM
The introductory section in the 1966 Demonstration Cities Act de-
dares that "cities of all sizes do not have adequate resources to deal
effectively with critical problems . . . ."I Model Cities was designed to
increase and improve the use of urban resources. 2 First, cities partici-
pating would receive "supplemental grants" which could be used
according to local needs and priorities, within broad federal guide-
lines. Second, existing intergovernmental resources would be better
used through increased coordination of existing programs and agencies
and through "innovative and imaginative planning and action." s
When Model Cities' policies and regulations were written, the
approaches embodied in legislation were translated into a series of
explicit "leverage" strategies [indicated below in italics]. Each was
based on a mixture of shibboleth and truth about the changes required
to make unresponsive institutions meet urban needs.
Through requiring systems planning, Model Cities tried to make
cities use resources more effectively through realistic identification of
obstacles and opportunities.4 Model Cities agencies, called City Dem-
onstration Agencies (CDAs), were instructed to analyze "problems,"
identify "goals," develop "program approaches," set up "strategies,"
draft "one-year action programs," and develop individual "projects."
Each of these steps had to be rationally interrelated and done in a
sequential manner.
This rational approach to planning was envisioned as an apolitical
means to compel a more efficient use of existing funds and staff and to
1. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3301
(1966).
2. For a history of the program's beginnings, see F. Jordan, Model Cities in
Perspective, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE CENTER BULL. 4-8 (special ed., June 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Jordan] and J. James, The Model Cities Program, Spring
1971 (a paper prepared for the subcommittee on Housing, Committee on Banking
and Currency, U.S. House of Representatives) [hereinafter cited as James].
3. James.
4. Letter #4 from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
to Community Development Agency, Comprehensive Program Submission Require-
ment, July 1968. This letter contains 39 pages of detailed procedural requirements
for submitting a comprehensive program.
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require the inclusion of relevant, previously excluded factors, into the
city's decision-making processes.
The second strategy, coordinating intergovernmental resources, was
based on the premise that existing governmental programs were de-
fective mainly in funding levels, rather than in content. Concentrated
federal categorical program assistance would be made available to
Model Cities to fund the major part of the programming. This con-
centration would allow existing categorical programs to be effective
and enable sufficient provision of services to solve the fundamental
problems of ghetto neighborhoods.5
Citizen participation, a third strategy, was envisioned as a means to
force a coalition between residents in model neighborhoods and the
elected city officials.6 This coalition would be able to pressure the
paralyzed bureaucracies which characterize most city governments and
make them more open and responsive to new ideas and to residents'
articulated needs. However, participants at both federal and local
levels held diverse views about the appropriate roles of citizens in such
coalitions. Some saw Model Cities as a vehicle for advancing decen-
tralization and citizen control of neighborhood services and commu-
nity development efforts.' Others viewed the citizen role more mini-
mally and, stressing the role of the chief executive, argued for
relegating citizens to an advisory role.8
Finally, flexible supplemental grants were to be provided to enable
cities to fill the gaps in categorical programs with innovative programs
to solve problems more effectively than conventional services. The
major premise of this approach was that, free from federal and state
guidelines in traditional categorical programs, local CDAs would be
able to develop programs better suited to the needs of particular
5. Letter #3 from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
to Community Development Agencies, Citizen Participation, Nov. 30, 1967. See
HUD Technical Assistance Bulletin No. 3 (Dec. 1968); M. Mogulof, Citizen Par-
ticipation: A Review and Commentary on Federal Policies and Practices, January,
1970 (a paper published by The Urban Institute, 2100 M Street N.W., Washing-
ton, D.C. 20037) ; and BOoz-ALLEN AND HAMILTON, STUDY OF CITIZEN PARTICIPA-
TION IN THE MODEL CITIES PROoRM (June 30, 1971).
6. Improving Local Capacity, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE CENTER BULL. 34
(special ed., June 1971). See S. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35
J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 216-224 (1969).
7. Jordan at 6.
8. KAPLAN, GANS, AND KAHN AND THE RESEARCH GROUP, MODEL CITIES
SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS STUDY 1 (February 1971) ; Jordan at 4.
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neighborhoodsY Program architects saw Model Cities projects as the
"cutting edge" of urban change.
An unexamined idea behind the deployment of these strategies was
the premise that each would somehow multiply the effect of the others,
a type of federal synergy. Moreover, while the program designers
shared a commitment to these strategies, the degrees of allegiance to
each varied. As a result, the contradictions between the strategies,
inherent in the legislation, were not resolved in the regulations. In-
stead, they were crystallized, and the mixture of myth and truth in
each strategy, as well as the contradictions, went unchallenged.
These inadequacies in the legislation would have been less impor-
tant had the original goal of designating only a handful of Model
Cities been followed. However, these flaws became glaring as political
necessity forced the expansion of the program into first 63, and then
150 cities, without a commensurate rise in the resources devoted to the
program.
On the positive side, Model Cities, as it was initially conceived, was
more sophisticated and comprehensive than earlier federal interven-
tionist programs. The program was designed to allow sufficient time
for planning. It also included, as previous interventionist programs
had not, the participation of citizens, autonomous local agencies, and
relevant decision-makers from local general purpose governments.
These features, however, were inadequate to outweigh the disadvan-
tages of the program's basic approaches.
FAILURE OF THE ORIGINAL MODEL CITIES STRATEGIES
For a variety of reasons, the initial strategies of the Model Cities
program proved unworkable. Not only did each prove to be un-
tenable itself, but in combination each reduced the impact of the
others.
The systems planning approach mandated by HUD proved overly
complex and irrelevant. When urban problems are pervasive and
beyond the reach of any available amount of resources, it satisfies only
distant bureaucrats to manipulate ancient census data to develop
"need" assessments. Yet HUD mandated a quantitative approach,
even though called-for data was either unavailable or could only be
improvised by ingenious program planners.
9. Jordan at 4.
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The difficulties of devising and manipulating numbers were exacer-
bated in most cities by lack of local government capacity. Even where
local decision-makers were capable, they often lacked commitment to
the program and viewed it as a buy-off for vocal minorities. Other
cities spent so much time defining the roles of citizens versus city and
CDA versus existing agencies that little energy was left for developing
plans for spending even supplemental grants, much less categorical
federal programs. The conflict between systems planning and citizen
participation in this regard was serious.
As a result of all these factors. Model Cities' planning decisions were
generally ad hoc and haphazard, although virtually every city met the
"paper plan" requirements of HUD. The most effective CDA direc-
tors knew the plans were "phony," and produced whatever paper was
necessary for HUD to award their cities supplemental grants. Unfor-
tunately, the less effective directors were trapped in a paper web which
diverted them from both the immediate operational problems and
the development of effective strategies.'0
Although many cities anticipated the promised coordination and
concentration of federal resources in their Model Cities plan, those
resources were seldom delivered. HEW did earmark one-third of its
research and development funds for Model Cities use. However, even
that commitment represented less than one-half of one per cent of
HEW's total non-trust fund appropriation, most of which is allocated
to states through formula grants and then distributed to local health,
education, and welfare agencies, according to state plans over which
the department has limited control."
The response from other federal agencies was even more disappoint-
ing. The Department of Labor's Concentrated Employment Program
was linked to some Model Cities plans. However, DOL generally
viewed the program as a competitor rather than a resource coordinator
on the local level.
HUD often found that it could not coordinate a meaningful re-
10. KAPLAN, GANS, AND KAHN, THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM: A Co~iPARA-
TIrE ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS IN ELEVEN CITIES (1970) [Available
from U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.]; KAPLAN, GANS, AND
KAHN, THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE PLAN-
NING PROCESS IN ATLANTA, DAYTON AND SEATTLE (1969) [Available from U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.].
11. S. Gardner, Impact on a Federal Agency-HEW, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE
CENTER BULL. 14 (special ed., June 1971) [hereinafter cited as Gardner]. See
note 8, supra.
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sponse from other federal agencies in the absence of strong Presiden-
tial support, which was offered by neither Lyndon Johnson nor
Richard Nixon.12 In addition, the availability of supplemental funds
led many cities to ignore other possible sources of federal funds, an-
other example of Model Cities strategy conflict. As a consequence,
categorical program funds usually amounted to less than the supple-
mental grant allocated to most Model Cities.
The ambiguous concept of citizen participation continued to pose
difficult problems. Large-scale decentralization of services to citizen
groups in model neighborhoods was planned in some cities, especially
those in which the mayor abdicated from any role in program plan-
ning. In these cities, the program's systems planning and resource
coordination objectives became especially irrelevant. In most cities,
neither the city nor the citizens had a clear idea of how much control
each should have, a situation which often resulted in strife. In addi-
tion, after a number of cities had their first action years funded,
HUD's standards were revised by the Nixon administration, and roles
had to be shifted, reducing the power of citizens in some cities21
Innovation in programming was achieved only in a few Model
Cities. Frequently cities became so caught up in cumbersome planning
requirements, in confusion caused by non-delivery of federal programs,
and in the dilemmas of citizen participation, that few innovative or
"model" programs were developed. In 1970, after almost three years
of Model Cities, HEW inventoried its Washington desk officers, asking
for examples of new uses of health, education, and social services funds
by CDAs. Almost none were produced. 4 While this may reflect on
HEW's information network, it does illustrate the image of the pro-
gram in the federal government.
Generally, local government staffs and citizens seemed unable to
escape conventional or fashionable solutions to problems. Thus most
12. See E. BANFIELD, MODEL CITIES: A STEP TOWARDS THE NEW FEDERALISM;
THE REPORT OF TEE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON MODEL CITIES (1970) [Avail-
able from U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.].
13. Letter 4PIOB from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment to the Community Development Agency, Joint OEO-HUD Citizen Partici-
pation Agreement, March 1970; W. Bethea, A Regional Citizen's Group Looks
at Model Cities, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE BULL. 10 (special ed., June 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Bethea].
14. Internal Memoranda of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, Center for Community Planning, Fall 1970.
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Model Cities programs were mixtures of conventional services and
current fads, such as housing development corporations and multi-
service centers. 15
MODEL CITIES IN TRANSITION
Model Cities can only be understood in the context of its develop-
ment. As the stereotyped strategies of the program failed, participants
had to redefine their approaches to make their local programs viable.
As Model Cities undertook their first "action" years, few were able to
leverage their resources; in fact, most were unable to spend their first
year supplemental grants within twelve months.- In terms of dollar
amounts, the program's supplemental funds have had a multiplier
effect of about 1 to 1, much less than the 1 to 4 envisioned by early
program architects.17 During the first years of the program, no one
had a clear vision of what it should realistically accomplish. As a
result, many city halls ignored the program either because it seemed
unworkable or because it was viewed as simply a successor to the pov-
erty program. Citizens lost faith for similar reasons. In some cities,
both citizens and city hall demurred, leaving Model Cities agencies
in limbo. To make matters worse, some agencies were staffed with
unqualified members of minority neighborhoods as part of an uneasy
compromise over control of the program. Although politically ac-
ceptable, these staff members were seldom trained in the technical
"niceties" of the federal programs and were often unable to represent
their communities adequately. As a result, they were ill-equipped to
transcend the difficulties of merely getting supplemental grants spent,
to say nothing of solving problems of institutional change. Overall,
much less was accomplished during the first years of Model Cities
than had been anticipated. The program was not a success of social
engineering.
Despite these difficulties, Model Cities laid the groundwork in a few
cities for significant achievements. As many cities moved from plan-
15. See Model Cities and The Program Areas, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE CENTER
BULL. 42-76 (special ed., June 1971) ; S. HARRIS ASSOCIATES, LTD., EARLY PHASE
EXPERIENCE OF SELECTIVE MODEL CITIES PROoRAMS (Aug. 1970) [Available from
Sam Harris Associates, Ltd., Washington, D.C.].
16. Survey of 140 Model Cities by Model Cities Service Center, May 1971. For
the overall spending rate in Model Cities, see the graph, Outlay of Supplemental
Funds, 2 MODEL CITES SERVICE CENTER BULL. 8 (special ed., June 1971).
17. For a comparison of the supplemental to categorical funding ratio, see the
graph, Funding Generated by Model Cities Programs, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE
CENTER BULL. 17 (special ed., June 1971).
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ning into action, citizen interest was revived as projects appeared,
channeling money, jobs, and services into neighborhoods. The
appearance of promised supplemental funds also revived involvement
of city agencies and finally gave CDAs legitimate status in the bureau-
cratic community. Simplification of HUD's planning requirements in
late 1969 to make them more realistic also gave new life to hopelessly
inert CDAs still tangled in paper programs.18 In a few cities these
developments plus different methods of planning and resource manip-
ulation spelled the true success of Model Cities as an effort to effec-
tively assess and meet the problems of poor neighborhoods.
REDEFINITION OF MODEL CITIES STRATEGIES
The result of several years of action in Model Cities has been the
development in some cities of second generation strategies to replace
those originally part of the program.
In systems planning, the focus of the program has shifted from the
initial mechanistic application of the systems approach to an incre-
mental approach designed to meet the differing political and institu-
tional needs of each city.' 9 Model Cities is now viewed, both locally
and nationally, as a way to increase the capacity of the local chief
executive.20 This increased capacity involves greater chief executive
responsibility for program implementation and provides a means to
better evaluate operational performance of local agencies, in non-
quantitative but politically meaningful ways.
In many effective CDAs, the director is a planning and coordinating
arm of the chief executive, giving him knowledge of state and federal
programs and a fresh point of view. The director can thus suggest inno-
vative approaches which might otherwise be lost in the daily grind of
maintaining the equilibrium of conventional agencies.2' In others, the
CDA is providing the chief executive with additional staff to pressure
traditional agencies to be more innovative and responsive to low-
18. HUD Circular MC 3140.3, Dec. 1, 1969.
19. G. Horton, Strengthening Local Government, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE
CENTER BULL. 19 (special ed., June 1971).
20. JOINT REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
AND THE MODEL CITIES SERVICE CENTER OF THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES,
U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, CITY MANAGEMENT AND MODEL CITIES (June
1971).
21. Means for Institutional Change, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE CENTER BULL.
38-40 (special ed., June 1971).
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income citizens' needs. - In many cities, Model Cities increased the
ability of local government to coordinate traditionally independent
agency activities.
In the area of resource coordination and concentration, the dis-
appointing amount of categorical funds made available for Model
Cities forced most CDAs to shift their concern to redirecting existing
federal project-grant and formula-grant funds into the Model Neigh-
borhood. To obtain these funds, cities are trying to educate federal,
state, and local administrators to be more responsive to inner-city
priorities. -3
The most effective CDA directors have learned to manipulate the
federal system, using its own rhetoric to make it deliver resources and
technical assistance. One city invested two years in combining a num-
ber of federal and state-administered categorical programs with Model
Cities supplemental money to fund a comprehensive health services
system in the Model Neighborhood.2 4
In a number of states, Model Cities is used to make state agencies
more responsive to local needs. These efforts are becoming increas-
ingly important, as Model Cities moves into second and third "action"
years. There is a need to transfer projects to more traditional funding
sources to free supplemental funds or to assure continuation of projects
when Model Cities is over.2
In citizen participation, the issue of neighborhood control is no
longer as compelling as it was. A number of cities are slowly and
painfully developing models of shared power which more adequately
distinguish between the appropriate roles of city officials and citizens.
Model Cities is an important transitional arena for emerging minority
politics. In a few, CDAs are playing critical roles in helping "reform"
mayors change local bureaucracies on behalf of black and brown con-
stituents. -6
In the area of innovation, "model" programs are appearing in some
cities; but more importantly, the Model Cities program is expanding
22. See note 6 supra.
23, Gardner at 17. For an excellent theoretical discussion of this and other
important aspects of the program see J. SUNDQUIST with D. DAVIs, MAKING
FEDERALISM WORK ch. 3 (1969).
24. HEALTH DrvsIoN, SEATTLE MODEL CITIES PROGRAII, WORK PROGRA,:
PREPAID HEALTH COVERAGE PLAN (March 1970).
25. Improving State-Local Relationships, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE CENTER
BULL. 22 (special ed., June 1971).
26. Bethea at 10.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
the use of these innovations which were tested on a smaller scale. The
Office of Economic Opportunity's original fourteen Housing Develop-
ment Corporations (HDCs) have been followed by over 90 HDCs in
Model Cities. 27 The fourteen-city pilot Multi-Service Center program
is being duplicated to some extent in almost every model city.28 The
need to provide technical assistance to expedite innovations has been
recognized, and both the federal government and the cities have pro-
vided assistance to an unparalleled extent.
ENTREPRENEURIAL PLANNING
More important than the redefinition of Model Cities strategies has
been the development of a new approach to urban problem solving.
A few CDA directors have used the complex melange of the Model
Cities experience to develop a resource utilization approach best called
"entrepreneurial." Its developers have melded the strategies of system
planning, resource concentration, citizen participation, and technical
innovation into a combined approach to institutional change.28 This
utilizes elements of the original Model Cities strategies only as they
are tactically useful for achieving change and does not view them as
valid in themselves. The conversion of these strategies into tactical
resources marks the beginning of a realistic approach to social plan-
ning in this country.
Social change can be achieved, as these Model Cities approaches
have demonstrated, not through social panaceas, but through an entre-
preneurial approach to power relationships, political patronage, and
intergovernmental programs. The CDA directors who utilize this
approach use part of the Model Cities' planning vocabulary to influ-
ence bureaucrats intimidated by jargon, supply information and spe-
cific demands to citizens groups for them to use against vulnerable
local agency heads, use the rhetoric of federal program standards to
require performance from state and local agencies, and use flexible
supplemental money to "buy into" the planning and delivery of other
municipal services. Strategies are chosen for either programmatic or
27. Housing Development, 2 MODEL CITIES SERVICE CENTER BULL. 57-58
(special ed., June 1971).
28. Social Service Delivery, 2 MODEL CiTas SERVICE CENTER BULL. 67-68
(special ed., June 1971).
29. For a related discussion, see J. King, Strategic Planning Versus Service De-
livery Planning, and S. Gardner, The CDA Director as a Political Manager, 2
MODEL CITIES SERVICE CENTER BULL. (Fall 1971).
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political reasons when they can provide a rationale for institutional
change.
While traditional distinctions between long and short range, com-
prehensive and functional planning continue to be relevant, this non-
ideological and incremental approach to planning, concerned pri-
marily with institutional change, represents an important new force
in local government. Instead of trying to institutionalize liberal
panaceas, cities using this approach are beginning to deal with actual
problems.
However, the full nature of this new approach has not been per-
ceived by most Model Cities participants, much less used. Many CDAs
are still trying to implement distorted versions of original program
objectives. Still others have retreated from those early aims and
adopted narrow goals which have resulted in using supplemental
grants as another form of categorical funds, rendering Model Cities
an inadequate version of already existing urban renewal, employment,
or welfare programs.
CONCLUSION
Model Cities has reached the limits of the federal interventionist
approach. It has shown that planning technique is no substitute for
building local government capacity; that coordination of federal and
state resources requires delving into and changing the entire federal-
state-local transfer system; that citizens-while, perhaps they cannot
run programs-are invaluable allies for change; and that technically
innovative programs can be instituted, if not originated, on the local
level if sufficient resources and technical assistance are made available.
Most important, Model Cities has shown the paramount importance
of a change-oriented strategic approach to community development
which must accompany the provision of resources to deal with urban
problems.
Only through such a non-dogmatic approach can the complex reality
of social institutions be apprehended and changed. Future federal
community development efforts will have to be shaped to meet the
fundamental needs and the institutional change approach which
Model Cities has brought into focus.
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